幾天前在一論壇與網友討論中途島之役,基本上都同意Jonathan Parshall 和 Anthony Tully 兩名作者所撰 Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway 的論證,即日本航艦作戰準則(doctrine)對南雲的決定有很重大的影響;而航艦起降作業所需的準備時間也讓淵田所謂的「命運五分鐘」不可能存在,在美國VB-6, VS-6, 和 VB-3中隊對「赤城」、「加賀」、「蒼龍」三艦俯衝之時,日本航艦不可能完成出擊前的甲板擺置(spotting)即將起飛。
不過,網友對於各航艦是否已經開始擺置有所疑問,他的問題是基於 Parshall & Tully 分析的日本航艦甲板作業程序,認為需要一個小時左右的時間來完成擺置才能起飛;也因此對「飛龍」能在三艦被炸後的短短半小時內(夏威夷時間 10:27 AM ~ 10:58 AM)完成18架九九艦爆與5架零戰的擺置開始起飛有所疑問。在此歸納一下相關的問題:
二戰時航艦無法多工,同時間只能做一件事,而且還是批次處理。進行全甲板攻擊擺置時是最脆弱危險的時刻,所以要趕快完成。若要放飛 CAP,通常要事先就計畫好且準備好,放飛的 CAP 必須在所有的護航零戰擺完後放在最前面。護航零戰擺置若未完成,自然不能在那邊等CAP零戰熱完機起飛後再繼續擺置。如珍珠港攻擊第一波出發之前,以及中途島攻擊隊起飛前都有發出 CAP。這在事前就計畫好,不是臨時插隊。即使如此,第一波 CAP 通常不會太多,中途島攻擊隊起飛前的 CAP 各艦也僅發出一個小隊(三架),共11架。
這對 CAP 放飛的限制也讓各國都去實驗從機庫直接彈射飛機,以備在飛行甲板擺置或機群降落的同時還能讓一些飛機起飛,不影響批次流程。
在這種情形下,冒險移動少數幾架較輕的零戰做 CAP 還勉強有可能,若要繼續移動擺置更重的艦爆或艦攻,應該是辦不到的。下面看一個美軍的例子。
USS Enterprise 在1942年10月26日聖塔克魯茲海戰(Battle of Santa Cruz)時被日本海軍俯衝轟炸機攻擊的影片片段
根據 USS Enterprise 有關聖塔克魯茲海戰的戰鬥報告, 可見防空戰鬥的確對飛機的整備與起飛會有嚴重的干擾:「7. .... At 1026 ENTERPRISE turned into the wind (110° T) to land returning aircraft low on gas, and immediate reservicing and rearming were commenced to send these planes out to attack. Enemy air attacks interfered with servicing and prevented launching.」
9. At 1115 the first dive bombing attack on ENTERPRISE commenced. The attacking planes were not seen until well in their dives when they were quickly opposed by dense AA fire, and the ship maneuvered radically in evasion. Of an estimated 24 attacking planes, 7 were observed to be shot down and crashed in the sea, and others were harassed into making wild releases. The attack lasted about 4 minutes and was pressed home with determination. One bomb hit and pierced the flight deck 20 feet from the forward end. One of the aircraft spotted forward caught on fire and was pushed over the side. Another was blown overboard by the blast. The bomb passed through the forecastle deck and the skin of the ship, exploding just outside off the extreme bow. Bomb fragments pierced the hull in 160 places between the waterline and the forecastle deck level. A second bomb hit the flight deck almost on the centerline ten feet abaft the forward elevator. It is possible that it divided into two parts after passing through the flight deck, as there were two separate holes in the hangar deck. On the other hand, it is possible that the second hole in the hangar deck was caused by one of several of our own bombs, which were being loaded on planes forward on the hangar deck, being exploded by the bomb hit. In any event, there was one explosion at the hangar deck level, causing blast and fragment damage and casualties on the hangar deck, and making a shambles of the officers' country on the second deck between frames 38 and 54, causing a number of casualties, and starting fired that were quickly under control. There was a second explosion on the third deck at frame 39 in Repair Two, causing numerous fatalities, many injuries and heavy general damage between frames 38 and 64. It is the opinion of the Bomb Disposal Officer that the two explosions were caused by a single bomb which broke in two. His detailed analysis in support of this theory is appended to the War Damage Report, enclosure (C). A third bomb detonated close aboard near frame 129 starboard, cracking the after bearing pedestal of No. 2 H.P. turbine, opening a seam in the side plating to a maximum of three inches extending from frame 123 to frame 135, flooding two empty fuel tanks, and opening a third tank which was full. The ship shook violently as a result of this explosion. Planes parked in Fly I were bounced clear of the deck and the farthest one forward on the starboard side fell over the side. One plane in Fly III was bounced into the starboard 20mm battery.
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